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The machine tool industry, though a very small part of
the metal-working industry2 in all countries, is
nevertheless generally regarded as strategic: it
produces the machines to make all other machines.
This 'spider in the web' position of the machine tool
industry has led many economic theorists and
planners to give it central importance [eg Feldman
1965; Mahalanobis 1955/56; Raj and Sen 1961;
Cooper l983].
This article discusses how industrial policy in South
Korea (hereafter Korea) and Taiwan is helping the
machine tool producing firms to improve their
technological capabilities and move into the pro-
duction of computer numerically controlled machine
tools. The next section contains a brief outline of the
character of technical change in the industry globally,
and shows how the nature of competition has been
changing. Then follows an outline of the main
characteristics of the machine tool industries
in Korea and Taiwan, and how the government
historically fostered the industry. Finally, we discuss
the appropriateness of present government policies for
fostering further advance of the machine tool
industries.
Technical Change and the Nature of
Competition in the Industry
The machine tool industry has been undergoing rapid
technical change, and associated with this change
there has been an alteration in the nature of
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competition in the industry. The technical change
originates outside the machine tool industry, in the
electronics industry. The influence of the electronics
industry is manifested by a substitution of con-
ventional machine tools by computer numerically
controlled (henceforth CNC) machine tools.
The first machine tool controlled by a numerical
control unit was produced in the 1950s, but the
diffusion of this new technology began to be
significant only after 1970 when the first mini
computer-based CNC unit was developed. Since 1975,
when the first micro-computer-based CNC Unit was
developed, the diffusion has become very rapid
indeed, and by 1981, around 40 per cent of the
investment in metal cutting machine tools was made in
CNC machine tools in Japan, the US and in Sweden.
The ratio had increased to nearly 46 per cent in Japan
by 1982.
Among the metal cutting machine tools, lathes are
feeling the greatest impact from the electronics
industry. In Sweden in 1981, 78 per cent of the
investment in lathes was accounted for by CNC lathes
whilst the average in the main OECD countries
amounted to around 50 per cent. It is noteworthy that
the lathe is also the single most important machine
tool produced in both Korea and Taiwan. In Korea in
1982,47 per cent (in value terms) of the metal cutting
machine tools produced were lathes whilst 74 per cent
of exports were lathes. In Taiwan, 38 per cent of the
value of exports of machine tools in 1981 consisted of
lathes.
Associated with the change in the product technology
of at least some machine tools, the nature of
competition in the global machine tool industry has
altered. Traditionally the machine tool producing firm
is a small firm, the industry being very atomised. For
example, the medium plant size in Germany and the
US is just over 400 employees [Jones 1983]. In Taiwan,
a number of very small firms exist and profitably
produce conventional machine tools. For example,
one firm which produces engine lathes, the simpler
type of lathe, employs only 150 people.
However, for those firms producing metal-cutting
machine tools, and mainly lathes, milling, drilling and
boring machines, major changes are taking place as
regards the structure of the industry in which they
operate. Size is becoming a much more important
factor than it used to be, as illustrated by data on the
Japanese CNC lathe industry. The five leading firms
produced 60 per cent of the total Japanese production
of CNC lathes in 1975. This share grew to 76 per cent
in 1981. The average output of these firms in terms of
units of CNC lathes was approximately 160 in 1975.
This grew to 1,600 in 1981. In terms of value, the
average output of CNC lathes grew from US$7.9m in
1975 to US$llOm in 1981 in current prices
{Chudnovsky et al 1983 j.
The large size of the firms reflects the very substantial
economies of scale that can be reaped not only in the
production of CNC lathes but also in the production
of machining centres. A machining centre is a
computer controlled machine tool which combines
milling, drilling and boring capabilities. Together with
CNC lathes, machining centres account for the bulk of
the CNC machine tools produced. The size of the
machine tool firms producing CNC machine tools also
reflects the growth in the need for design capabilities in
order to be able to keep up in the ever faster rate of
technical change. Whilst the Taiwanese firm mentioned
above survives in the market for conventional lathes
with five design engineers, firms attempting to
compete internationally in the CNC lathe field need 10
or even 20 times the number of design engineers. Some
Japanese firms even employ several hundred design
engineers.
The Machine Tool Industries of Taiwan
and Korea
The origin of the Taiwanese machine tool industry is
fairly recent. After the Second World War the
development of the industry was retarded by the small
size of the local market as well as by the low technical
level of its customers [Amsden 1977]. However,
towards the middle or end of the 1960s, the industry
began to grow in response to both greater local capital
accumulation and, especially, to growing regional
demand resulting particularly from the Vietnam war.
The Taiwanese machine tool industry took advantage
of the demand for tow quality and low performance
machine tools by very price sensitive customers.
The industry became export oriented at an early stage,
and by 1968 had achieved a 50 per cent export share.
The exports were mainly for the regional market
initially, but in the mid l970s, the main market for the
Taiwanese machine tool industry became the USA. In
1981, over 77 per cent of exports went to developed
countries. Indeed, Taiwan is the fourth largest
exporter of machine tools to the US. By 1977 Taiwan
became a net exporter of machine tools, the first
newly industrialising country (NIC) to reach this
position. The export orientation (in 1981 Taiwan
exported 73 per cent of production) was conducive to a
very rapid growth in the production of machine tools.
The value of production rose from US$22mn in 1973
to US$242mn in 1981. Although the export market
shifted to the developed countries, the strategy of
focusing on the more sensitive segments of the market
continued.
By all standards the Taiwanese machine tool industry
has been very successful. The perhaps surprising
conclusion reached when studying the role of
government policy is that there has been very little
directed governmental influence on the industry. The
nominal tariff rate has been very low, around 10 per
cent, and the effective tariff has been about the same.
Some subtle import controls on machine tools exist,
but are almost certainly less stringent than Korea's.
On the whole, the growth in the capability of Taiwan's
machine tool industry has occurred gradually and
'autonomously' from an initial choice of pro-
duct/market mix with low barriers to entry. The
indirect influence of government policy on this process
has probably been greater than its direct influence. Of
particular importance to the export success has been
the stability in the real exchange rate, ensuring stable
relative prices of foreign and domestically made
goods. This stability has, of course, had the effect of
reducing the risks involved in investing in a marketing
network abroad, and has allowed the entrepreneurs to
base their strategies on expansion in foreign markets.
Finally, the domestic demand for machine tools has
been constantly growing and has not, in contrast to
many other economies, fluctuated greatly.
As in the case of Taiwan, the Korean machine tool
industry originated in the period after the Second
World War. The industry remained very small,
however, until the mid l970s. In terms of value of
production it was only marginally smaller than
Taiwan's, but Korea's GNP is far larger than
Taiwan's. Furthermore, the export ratio was very low
(only 12 per cent in 1974). In the second half of the
1970s the Korean machine tool industry went through
a period of explosive growth. Production rose from
US$l3mn in 1973 to US$178mn in 1981 (Table 1).
Exports failed, however, to rise to a level comparable
with Taiwan; only 18 per cent was exported in 1981.
The fast growth in the production of machine tools
was instead based on a very rapidly growing home
market. By 1979, Korea had become the tenth largest
investor in machine tools in the world. The Korean
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expansion of machine tool production has a large
element of import substitution; the import share of
machine tool investment declined from 73 per cent in
1974 to 39 per cent in 1981. In contrast, Taiwan's
import share is around 60 per cent - a difference
related to the fact that in Taiwan it is a government
agency which decides whether to allow imports or not,
while in Korea it is the machine tool makers
association itself that has the delegated power to
decide. Unlike Taiwan, Korea is still, however, a net
importer of machine tools. In 1981 the trade deficit
amounted to around $100m, a figure which can be
compared to the total investment in machine tools in
the same year of $331.3mn.
Table 1
Production of machine tools in the Republic of Korea
and Taiwan 1971-81, selected years
(in US$ mn)
Sources: - Taiwan's Machine Tool Manufacturers' Association
- Korea: 1971-77: Economic Planning Board: Report on
Mining and Manufacturing Survey (various). Machine
tools are here defined as KSIC 3823 land 38232. For 1979
and 1981: American Machinist, February 1981 and
February 1983.
Apart from the rapid growth in domestic demand,
which indeed was a function of the Korean
government's major effort to build up a machine tool
industry in Korea, the Korean Government has,
unlike its Taiwanese counterpart, played a major role
in the development of its machine tool industry
[Bendix et al 1978]. The central features of its policies
were:
- the availability of long term loans with subsidised
interest rates;
- import prohibitions on items which could be
produced locally;
- financial assistance to Korean machinery firms
who bought Korean-made machine tools.
A condition, or possibly a preference, was, however,
that the firms receiving such incentives should export a
certain proportion of their output.
The government interest in the machine tool industry
was further underlined in the 1981 Basic Plan for the
Advancement of the Machinery Industry. The instru-
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ments used by the government are again import
restrictions and credit policies. Thus, the Korean
Government has shown itself to be ready to intervene
greatly in the industry. The import substitution
character of the developmeni of the machine tool
industry also clearly suggests that the government has
been influential in its policies.
Government Policy and the Entry into
Production of CNC Machine Tools
Taiwan and the Republic of Korea have entered into
the production of both CNC lathes and machining
centres (Table 2). Both countries are far ahead of other
semi-industrialised countries in this field [Chudnovsky
et al 1983]. While Taiwan entered earlier than Korea,
Korea has now overtaken Taiwan in the production of
both CNC lathes and machining centres. In terms of
value, Korean production of these two types of
machine tools amounted to US$l6.5mn in 1982
against Taiwanese production of only US$9mn.
Korea has thus overtaken Taiwan, in spite of the latter
country's earlier start. However, in terms of the
requirements set by the international nature of
competition, all firms in both countries produce below
the minimum efficient scale of production. As
mentioned earlier, scale is now very important and
indeed, only one out of eight firms interviewed in these
countries claimed that they made a profit on the
production of CNC lathes. In both countries the
machine tool industry is very atomised. In Korea 17
firms produce lathes; in Taiwan, 30. (Total lathe
production in Taiwan is however larger than Korea's.)
Of this population, three firms in Korea and two or
three firms in Taiwan have emerged as leaders on the
basis of scale of output and 'mass' of technological
capabilities. These five or six firms produce nearly all
of the CNC machine tools in these countries. These
firms all have sales of between US$10 and US$2Omn
and have a design staff of between 30 and 60 engineers.
Other firms producing conventional machine tools
survive only in a much smaller form.
Although most of these firms are not yet competitive
on the world market for CNC machine tools, they are
the only ones to have a reasonable chance of being able
to become successful in the light of the requirements
set by the international industry. To the extent that we
accept the argument of the strategic nature of the
machine tool industry, it is of interest to the rest of the
society that these firms do make it. Given that the
objective function of the government includes a
healthy domestic machine tool industry, the question
arises as to whether the government needs to intervene
in the market and if so, how?
Korea Taiwan
1971 5.2 12.8
1973 12.6 22.0
1977 73.7 67.8
1979 163.7 189.1
1981 178.0 242.3
Table 2
Production of CNC lathes and machining centres in Taiwan and Korea
(units)
Source: - Taiwan: Industrial Technology Research Institute for 1977-82 in the case of machining centres. The same source was used for
CNC lathes except for 1982 which is author's own survey.
Korea: for 1982, Ministry of Commerce and Industry. For other years, data are the production data of the leading producer of
CNC lathes in Korea. 1981 production may be a slight underestimate.
Although the argument about the central role of the
machine tool industry bases itself mainly on the
existence of external economies, which according to
conventional economics would be a reason in favour
of intervention, the main arguments in favour of such
an intervention are the non marginal changes in the
nature of competition in the industry. For these fiims,
the question is not to advance gradually to a
marginally stronger position in terms of skills and
financial strength, but rather to implement radical
changes. Design personnel and sales often need to be
doubled at least, and the marketing network needs to
be strengthened, as does production capacity. Large
investments therefore need to be undertaken, and as
such investments normally involve a radical change in
strategy the uncertainties and risks are perceived by
the firms to be great. A call for government
intervention is therefore justified on account of what
economists call imperfections' in the capital market.
Both Taiwan and Korea have designed specific
policies for the machine tool industry. Whilst the
Korean policy has been in operation for sometime, the
Taiwanese one was initiated as late as 1982. The two
main elements are trade restrictions and credit
policies.
In February 1983, the Taiwanese Government was at
least contemplating a rise in the tariff rate to 20 per cent
for some more advanced machine tools, including
CNC machine tools. The Korean Government allows
import restrictions to be applied for machine tools
which can be produced domestically. The noteworthy
aspect of this policy is that it is the Machine Tool
Manufacturers Association which in reality decides
which machine tools can be produced locally, and
therefore those which can be imported. In the case of
CNC lathes in Korea, the present rule is that all CNC
lathes below a certain size must be supplied from
domestic sources. As the size limit is larger, the vast
majority of CNC lathes cannot be imported.4 It is also
the case that the import share of investment in CNC
lathes dropped from 85 per cent in 1981 to 31 per cent
in 1982 in value terms.
Import restrictions, be they quantitative restrictions or
tariffs, are general policy instruments. Thus, as long as
a firm sells a CNC machine tool on the local market it
may be favoured by this policy. This also means that
the firms which in the long run do not stand a
reasonable chance of succeeding in this business will
be favoured. As all instruments of this kind are
associated with a cost to the consumer, resources will
be applied in an inefficient way as a consequence of the
general character of the instrument. Import restrictions
are, however, much more inappropriate from another
point of view. The strategic nature of the machine tool
industry has been partly attributed to its role as the
diffuser of new innovations, as discussed above. With
the application of import restrictions, the domestic
users of machine tools will be prevented from
benefitting from this role of the international machine
tool industry.
This point was understood in an interview conducted within the
framework of a project carried out with Dr Charles Edquist ort the
'Patterns ofspecialisation within the capital goods sectors of India
and the Republic of Korea'.
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Taiwan Korea
year CNC lathes machining centres CNC lathes machining centres
1977 14
1978 40 not available but
1979 78 7 probably zero
1980 106 24 9
1981 174 18 87
1982 163 53 222 75
Of course, to the extent that the domestic supplying
industry can produce the same range of CNC machine
tools as are supplied by the international industry, at a
price equal to the international price, the domestic
buyers of machine tools would not suffer. However,
leaving price differences aside, a fundamental feature
of the machine tool industry is the high degree of
product differentiation, which extends even to such a
well-defined product as CNC lathes. In the case of
CNC lathes the domestic industry in Korea produces
only low performance machinery. In the OECD
countries, the buyers of such machine tools are
generally very price sensitive small firms. However, in
Korea, where import restrictions apply to all CNC
lathes below a certain size, all machine tool buyers will
have to settle for the low performance Korean CNC
lathes.
The benefits accruing to the machine tool producers
from import restrictions on machine tools would arise
from having the home market to exploit and thereby
reaching a greater volume of production and thus
gaining from scale economies. However, the domestic
market in both these countries is so small in relation to
the minimum efficient scale of production that it can
be of only marginal use to local machine tool builders
[Chudnovsky et al 1983]. The very limited size of the
domestic market is also recognised by the firms, all of
whom regard the US market as their home market for
CNC machine tools. Thus, import restrictions in this
case are not only inefficient but also imply that local
users of machine tools will get less access to the new
international technology embodied in machine tools.
The other main component in government policies
concerns credit. In Korea, the state channelled large
amounts of capital into the machinery industry in the
second half of the l970s. The machine tool industry
also received credits with negative real interest rates.
Furthermore, some firms received subsidies because
they moved to the Changwon industrial complex in
the south of Korea in 1976-78. The most dramatic case
of government intervention is the build-up of the now
largest producer of CNC lathes in Korea, and indeed
in the NICs. This firm, which is part of a larger
conglomerate, started from scratch in 1977 with a loan
of over US$4Omn. Other firms also received credits,
but not on the same scale.
In Taiwan, the government implemented a Strategic
Industry Programme in 1982. The programme has
approximately US$250mn at its disposal and the
money is allocated to individual firms for the
production of about 115 types of product. It can be
used to finance up to 65 per cent of the costs of a new
project, including skill formation. The explicit
purpose of the fund is to absorb some of the risks
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associated with the initiation of new and more
advanced product lines. The second largest CNC
machine tool producer in Taiwan is one of the firms
which receive funding from this programme. The firm
is building a new plant for the production of a large
number of CNC machine tools using very advanced
production technology. Money is also available for the
other leading firms as and when they wish to use it.
Hence, in terms of the credit policies, both
governments have shown a willingness to design
policies which assist the leading firms in the machine
tool industry to enter or consolidate an entry into the
market for CNC machine tools. The magnitude of the
intervention is however different. Whilst complete
data are not available, the Korean intervention is
much greater than the Taiwanese. In part, this stems
from the different needs of the industry, the Korean
machine tool industry being younger than the
Taiwanese. In part, however, the difference reflects
greater overall state involvement in Korea than in
Taiwan, an involvement which has contributed to the
Korean industry overtaking the Taiwanese in the CNC
machine tool field.
Of course, in social cost benefit terms this does not
necessarily imply that the Koreans are better off, as the
cost of the intervention has been high. In conjunction
with the non marginal changes in the nature of
competition in the industry, the tremendous growth in
strength of the Korean industry may suggest however
that Taiwan may like to reconsider its present
comparatively marginal intervention.
Such a change in thinking would need to apply to
credit policy, which should be extended if the leading
firms want to initiate more radical changes in strategy
and compete directly with Japanese firms. The
possibility of restructuring the remaining part of this
atomised industry in order to increase the technological
and financial capabilities of the firms ought also to be
an area of concern. There is, however, a Chinese
proverb which says: 'Better the head of the chicken
than the tail of a cow' [Fransman 1983]. In other
words, firms will not voluntarily merge, or even
collaborate. It is typical that the six firms which
produce CNC lathes in Taiwan do not collaborate in
the purchase of components, nor in marketing - both
functions where there can be large economies of scale.
The leading firms would not necessarily need to merge
or collaborate, even though obvious benefits could
arise, but for the mass of small firms this would be a
prerequisite for possible future entry into CNC
machine tool production. The alternative in the long
run would be to face increasing competition in the
world market for conventional machine tools.
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